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ABSTRACT 
In this study we contrast forestry reforms and their stated objectives against 
the state of the forestry sector in Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua. Once we 
look at the policy failures that underlie the gap between policy objectives and 
the state of forestry, we find that stated policies are not implemented and their 
design is marked by intrinsic flaws. We conclude that there is a reform failure 
matched by a failure to reform. The Poverty Reduction Strategies of the three 
countries followed –and possibly reinforced– existing policy trends but they 
were unable to solve implementation problems and lack of coherence that 
mark the policies of the sector. 
 
Keywords 
Poverty, forest management, Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua. 
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FOREST MANAGEMENT IN BOLIVIA, HONDURAS AND 
NICARAGUA: REFORM FAILURES?1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Bolivia, Nicaragua and Honduras are endowed with large forest areas and vast 
tracts of their land can sustainably support only forest (e.g. UDAPE, 2004, 
Larson, 2003, Vallejos Larios and Guillén Coronado, 2006). While this is a 
constraint for the agricultural sector, it is also an opportunity for stimulating a 
forestry sector that could contribute to rural development and poverty 
reduction (e.g. Nygren, 2005; Oksanen et al., 2003; cfr. Wunder, 2001). In fact, 
the coincidence of natural capital – in the form of forests – and poverty 
suggests that forest management can be integrated in national policies to fight 
poverty ({Dasgupta, 1993}; Oksanen et al., 2003; Kay et al., 2007). Sustainable 
forest management and its potential to reduce poverty are currently high in the 
government agendas of the three countries, although policies to achieve these 
objectives can be traced back to at least a decade. One of the first examples of 
these policies is the establishment of the social forestry sector in the mid-1970s 
in Honduras. More recently, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) of 
the three countries take account of the potential of forest management to 
reduce poverty (Gobierno de Bolivia, 2001; Gobierno de Honduras, 2001; 
Gobierno de Nicaragua, 2001), forestry figures prominently in the National 
Development Plans of Nicaragua (Gobierno de Nicaragua, 2005) and Bolivia 
(Gobierno de Bolivia, 2006) and the new forest law of Honduras –approved in 
September 2007– also contains a poverty component. 
The forest management approach has largely mirrored the trends in the 
development discourse: in the 1970s emphasis was given to the role that the 
state should play in forest management, in the 1980s reform efforts attempted 
to privatize the forest and involve commercial loggers in the management, with 
oversight of state organizations. Since the 1990s, the mainstream discourse on 
forest management focuses increasingly on participation, decentralization and 
the involvement of communities and smallholders in forest management.  
This comparative analysis highlights common patterns and differences in 
the forestry sector across the three countries. We provide an assessment of the 
sector and a systematization of the factors that block sustainable forest 
management, contributing to the understanding past reform failures and to the 
ongoing discussion of possible ways forward. In this paper, we focus on the 
lack of implementation and on the inconsistencies in the regulatory framework 
                                                 
1 This work is part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper research project (see 
www.iss.nl/prsp) and the financial contribution of SIDA is gratefully acknowledged. I 
would like to thank Kristin Komivez, Geske Dijkstra, Cris Kay for their comments 
and various contributions. I would also like to thank Juan Carlos Aguilar and Rafael 
del Cid for their support during fieldwork.  
This study is dedicated to Mario Guifarro, killed while working for the protection of 
the Biosphere Tawahka and the enhancement of the welfare of its inhabitants. 
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and show how they represent a formidable obstacle to the success of the 
reforms. A special emphasis will be put on how forest management has been 
included in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and in the National 
Development Plans of the three countries, and how this inclusion has (or has 
not) affected the formulation and implementation of policies in the forestry 
sector.  
We find that the potential of forest management for development and the 
emphasis in policy documents and in government’s discourse are at odds with 
the situation in the forest. Notwithstanding the PRSP process, forest 
management policies –in the three countries– are marked by a lack of 
implementation and crucial parts of the regulation are still informed by older 
approaches that have already been proven unviable. In other words, in the 
three countries there is no transposition of principles stated in the official 
policies to the situation on the ground and the policies themselves show little 
coherence. As a result, in the forestry sector we find widespread illegality, 
policies that make life harder to the (few) actors who are trying to operate 
within the legal framework, high deforestation rates, and in general little socio-
economic benefits arising from forest management. 
 
2   FOREST MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 
A framework for the evaluation of forest management 
Let us start with outlining a framework for the evaluation of forest policies and 
their impact on forest management. Many aspects of forestry might come up 
for evaluation and a number of methodologies can provide guidelines for 
judging whether forests are managed properly. Specifically, environmental 
economics’ prescriptions suggest criteria such as optimality of the extraction 
rate of logs, productivity of forestry activities, and optimal rate of conversion 
of forest areas to alternative use (e.g. Bulte et al., 2000); in general these criteria 
evaluate the efficient use of forest resources. While these standards can provide 
indications of how forestry is contributing to the economy and highlight 
relevant aspects of forestry, the prescriptions based on them are seldom 
recognised by policy makers and social actors as relevant (Bromley, 2004). In 
this paper we will follow the more pragmatic – and arguably more useful – 
approach of evaluating policies with respect to the objectives they are meant to 
achieve.2 These objectives have been articulated in numerous policy arenas and 
in the three countries there is a consensus that emerges from institutional 
documents and conversations with stakeholders: the objective is sustainable 
management from the environmental, social and economic perspectives. 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of philosophical underpinnings of this choice and for a discussion 
of pragmatism in the context of economic analysis of environmental policies see 
Bromley, 2004; 2006. 
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The environmental side of sustainability is expressed in terms of 
maintenance of forest cover and of conservation of forest quality, the latter 
primarily in protected areas. In the paper we focus on forest management and 
extraction: they involve a larger part of the forest – if compared to protected 
forest – and affect the majority of the rural poor; the main environmental 
objective here is establishing sustainable forestry and maintain forest cover, but 
not strict conservation. Our main indicators of success (or lack thereof) are 
deforestation rates which are available in the three countries.  
Overall, forest management should be a part of rural development 
strategies and its impact on poverty could be classified in social and economic 
terms. The social perspective emphasizes that the poor need to benefit the 
most from forestry and policies should ensure not only the development of the 
sector, but also encourage the participation of the poorest part of the rural 
population is encouraged. The various policies that promote pro-poor forestry 
fall under the common name of ‘social forestry’ and are articulated in different 
ways in the three countries. In Bolivia it is community forestry that is relevant, 
in Nicaragua it is forestry undertaken by small-holders and in Honduras by 
cooperatives. The relative success of these initiatives in the three countries will 
help us assess the achievements of the sector in terms of social objectives. 
From the economic perspective relevant indicators will be employment, 
generation of revenues for the government, contribution to the export sector 
and to general economic activities.  
Finally, the development of legal forest activities and the downsizing of 
illegality is an overarching criterion. On the one hand, formal regulations 
contain safeguards that should guarantee environmental sustainability; on the 
other hand the economic potential of forest exploitation requires levels of 
investment and market conditions (in terms of prices, volumes, delivery and 
reliability) that are not compatible with illegal activities.  
Approaches to forest management 
The objectives of forest management have been changing over time and their 
evolution is mirrored by new policy models. The scientific forestry approach 
was developed in Europe and by the end of the 19th century it was transferred 
to the USA and to many developing countries (see Balogh, 2002). This 
approach is based on scientific management and its distinctive features are that 
the management systems are clearly identified in the law and regulations; that 
these systems are based on scientific models implemented by professionals 
dismissing local knowledge in favour of the knowledge transmitted via formal 
education; that they are informed by a command & control approach with a 
focus on enforcement and the assumption that forestry professionals and state 
agents are reliable. 
In general this model dismissed local actors, neglected forms of 
knowledge not sanctioned by science and the whole system was geared towards 
production and extraction of wood (i.e. to the establishment of a monocrop 
system; Shiva, 1993). Another feature worth stressing is that such model rests 
on strong assumptions on the effectiveness and capability of state institutions 
to implement the law and assure enforcement. These assumptions are at odds 
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with the reality of the field of forest management in many developing countries 
where these actors and the institutions that frame their actions are 
characterised by low resources and high corruption levels (e.g. Pellegrini, 2007; 
Robbins, 2000).   
The general failure that marked the implementation of the scientific 
forestry approach –especially in developing countries– to manage sustainably 
and equitably the forest stirred a movement towards more market-based 
policies and on economic incentives to maintain and manage efficiently forests 
(e.g. Repetto and Gillis, 1988). Also international financial institutions included 
in the structural adjustment programs several requirements with respect to 
privatization of natural resources, including forests. These changes were 
matched with the emphasis on securing property rights –often understood as 
‘private’ property rights– and on avoiding the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
(Hardin, 1968), beliefs on self-regulatory powers of markets and the central 
policy recommendations springing from this approach were privatization and 
market-based incentives. 
Also the move to privatize the forest fell short of its ambitious objectives 
while emerging evidence showed that local communities operating 
autonomously often achieve superior outcomes in terms of natural resources 
management when compared to centralised systems and private agents (see 
Ostrom, 1990; Folke, 2004; World Bank, 2008). This evidence contributed to a 
renewed appreciation of traditional ecological knowledge and of management 
systems based on collective action at the local level and made it also possible to 
focus on social inclusion as an objective of forest management. In sum, over 
time forestry policies in developing countries moved away from state control 
towards privatization followed by a more socially-oriented approach that 
emphasises local institutions, participation and decentralization. The PRSP 
process has taken place within this paradigm change and some of its features 
(e.g. participation and inclusion) certainly belong to the evolution in 
mainstream development thinking that brought forestry reforms at the order 
of the day. 
Sources and organization of the analysis 
This study is based on fieldwork realised in Bolivia in April 2007 and in 
Honduras and Nicaragua in July and August of the same year. We did over 100 
interviews with –among the others– government authorities (local and 
national), academics, community leaders, inhabitants of rural areas, business 
associations, entrepreneurs, cooperatives, trade unionists, international donors, 
multilateral financial institutions, and non governmental organizations. Also a 
number of secondary information sources were consulted together with legal 
and policy documents. To check the information that we gathered, we used 
triangulation: asking different actors their perspectives, controlling them with 
secondary sources and verify whether they were coincident. 
In the following analysis we briefly outline the state of the forest in the 
three countries, showing how the objectives of forest management are missed; 
then we discuss the policy frameworks that produce these outcomes. The 
unsatisfactory state of affairs in forest management, that we highlight here, is 
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widely recognised in each of the countries and the political establishment is 
continuously pressured to ‘reform’ the sector. Here we show how these 
tentative reforms are truncated and we give some recent examples of instances 
where new forestry policies are still grounded in the old assumptions of 
scientific forestry and do not contribute to a translation of new policy 
principles in new forestry practices. We also show how the PRSP process falls 
in line with ongoing developments in the sector and that it is difficult to 
distinguish any impact on existing policies. 
3  BOLIVIA   
The state of the forest and the potential of forestry 
Bolivia has 59 millions hectares covered with forest – 54.2% of the total area – 
and is one of the ten countries in the world with the most primary forest 
(FAO, 2007). Deforestation in the period 2004-2005 is estimated to be up to 
1% of forest cover per year (Wachholtz et al., 2006).3 Given the size and the 
quality of Bolivian forests, this rate indicates major forest loss and 
environmental damage. 
The Bolivian Government, supported by donor agencies, at the end of the 
1990s has decided to adopt an advanced method of land use planning 
matching biophysical characteristics of the soil with a participatory approach to 
public policies (Rojas et al., 2003: III, 12); these land use plans provide an 
opportunity to estimate the potential of forest management by comparing the 
area suitable for forest management with the area actually under management. 
In 2001 a decree based on the land use plans identified around 40 millions of 
hectares as permanent productive forest (“tierras forestales de producción 
permanente”): land whose use could only be forest. Out of the 40 millions 
hectares, 10.7 millions hectares are protected areas and 2.4 millions have some 
restrictions related to the provision of ecological services; hence around 30 
million hectares could be used for sustainable logging and the extraction of 
non-timber forest products (UDAPE, 2004; Pacheco, 2006a: 18, 51), but only 
8 millions hectares – less than 30% of the potential – are currently given in 
concession and have a management plan and this area decreased in size in 
2007.4 This gives a measure of the state of affairs when compared to the 
potential of forestry: while only a small part of the forest is exploited according 
to the formal management system, the rest is either left unexploited, or 
degraded with illegal logging, or affected by land use change. 
Even though so little of the Bolivian forestry potential is exploited the 
sector gives a remarkable contribution to the national economy: currently the 
forestry sector is contributing directly to around 3% of GDP and employs 
                                                 
3 According to FAO, the yearly deforestation rate for the period 2000- 2005 is 0.41% 
(FAO, 2007). 
4 Terrazas-Sedlak (Cámara Forestal), 2007, personal communication. 
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75,000 people. The majority of economic activity is in the timber sector, but 
notably the Brazilian nuts’ production contributes to 0.35% of GDP and 
employs 22,000 people (UDAPE, 2004).5 These data include only legal 
operations noted in the national accounts direct economic values, omitting 
environmental services altogether, but priceless services offered by the forest 
guarantee the viability of other economic sectors and the provision of water. 
The management of forests for the extraction of timber and of non-timber 
forest products adds to these services and can provide direct incentives for the 
conservation of the forest. Also, to the official contributions to the GDP we 
must add non-marketed economic benefits. In the case of poor households in 
the rural areas a substantial part of consumption comes directly from the 
forest; data at the national level are not available, but household surveys for 
Tsimane’ societies suggest that forest products can represent more than 50% 
of total consumption (see Godoy et al., 2002: 404).  
The logging sector is marked by lack of investment, and entrepreneurs 
indicate that juridical insecurity is limiting any inflow of capital in the limited 
areas that are under concession. Furthermore, firms operating in the sector are 
wary of the new emphasis on social forestry and of the fact that some 
concessions have been reverted during the land reform process.6   
Transportation costs represent the highest share of total costs of 
production and marketing of timber at an estimated 42% of the total (UDAPE, 
2004). Certification would be a way to achieve higher values per volume and 
reduce the incidence of transportation costs: certified wood gathers a 5 to 51% 
price premium when exported from Bolivia (Nebela et al., 2005). As of 
October 2007, Bolivia is the 7th country in the world in terms of Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) certified forest with 1.8 millions hectares (Forest 
Stewardship Council, 2007b) and 46 certified companies. This is an important 
achievement for the sector, it must be noted though that the momentum of 
certification has been slowing in recent years and the certified area under 
management might start to decrease if certified forest concessions are revoked 
in the land reform process. Moreover, price premiums associated to certified 
wood rarely trickle down to the communities: the experience of community 
forestry in the country is that communities are not getting better prices for 
their products following certification (Rodas et al., 2005:32), or when they do 
gather higher prices this happens only thanks to external support from non-
profit organizations (Stegeman, 2003: 31). In any case, obtaining higher prices 
                                                 
5 Another factor – apart from the limited area under management – that contributes 
to the slight contribution of the sector to the Bolivian economy is low productivity. 
The extraction focuses on few high value species and the result is that the average 
extracted volume is 3 m3/ha, and the estimated potential is 15 m3/ha (UDAPE, 2004; 
Benneker et al., 2005) and the transformation process is also wasteful at around half 
of the potential (Ibáñez-Chávez, Prefectura de La Paz, 2007, personal 
communication). 
6 Terrazas-Sedlak (Cámara Forestal), 2007, personal communication; “Forestales en 
alerta”, El Deber, 16/1/2007. 
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is an important objective of certification, but the benefits include improvement 
of entrepreneurial and administrative capabilities (i.e. increase in transparency, 
improved planning) that can be as, or more, important than more favourable 
market prices (see Salazar and Gretzinger, 2004a: 42-46). Overall, the diffusion 
of FSC certification can be considered a success of development cooperation 
qualified by the fact that without the support of donors there is still little 
practical interest in certification within communities. 
In sum, while forestry gives an important contribution to social and 
economic development of the country we find evidence that its potential is 
largely unexploited. Now we turn to the policy framework that created this 
situation. 
The policy framework 
In the mid-90s the sector was reformed: Bolivia’s legal framework attempted to 
make access to forest resources more “democratic” and the approval of the 
forestry law (“Ley forestal”, 1700, Gobierno de Bolivia, 1996b) was a milestone 
providing instruments for the poor to exploit forest resources in a legal way. 
This change followed the trends mentioned above and its stated objective was 
achieving social inclusion and making communities stewards of the forest 
thorough a new social orientation of the legal framework. Once the sector is 
analysed after ten years from the approval of the law it appears that the legal 
framework has more a nominal rather than a factual value and the policies that 
should have lent substance to legal predicaments were never put in place. 
These problems of implementation are compounded by actual contradictions 
that were present already in the formulation of the new policies. 
The forestry law was enacted during the so-called “second generation 
reforms” of the mid 1990s. After the structural adjustment programs of the 
1980s (the “first generation of reforms”) that liberalised and opened the 
economy, the government of Bolivia focused on improving matters in the 
social sphere. The forestry law reflects the emphasis of the government of the 
time: it provides a legal framework whose stated aim was to democratize the 
access to the forests – allowing marginalised communities to take advantage of 
natural resources while protecting the environment. The main instruments to 
that purpose were the recognition of rights of local social organizations 
(“Organizaciones sociales de base”) and of indigenous communities. In the 
same year, the law of land reform (“Ley INRA”, Gobierno de Bolivia, 1996a) 
would have complemented the forestry law allowing land ownership to be 
transferred to the poor.   
With respect to the conservation aspects of the law, the legal framework 
provides that in “permanent productive forest”, independently from the legal 
ownership of the land, land use change is prohibited. The forest must be 
managed according to a 20 years management plan and for state-owned forest 
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auctions should take place and concessions be distributed accordingly.7 A 
system of royalties should contribute to make the system self sustainable 
(financing investment, the regulatory framework, and partially contributing to 
financing local institutions).8 Extraction should follow management plans 
approved by the Forestry Superintendence (“Superintendencia Forestal”) that 
has the role to collect royalties and verify that the legal provisions are not 
violated. The structure of the model did focus on specialized knowledge and 
for its enforcement the capability and honesty of forestry professionals 
(drawing up and implementing management plans) and of  state agents 
(overseeing the whole process) were fundamental. Overall, the regulatory 
framework set up by the 1996 law contained management modalities and 
enforcement structures informed by the scientific forestry approach, together 
with social objectives and inclusive measures in line with the latest 
developments in forest management thinking. 
The Bolivia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Gobierno de Bolivia, 2001) 
includes forest management as an instrument for mitigating environmental 
risks and vulnerability and contains indications that policies should promote 
sustainable and equitable utilization of forest resources. The PRSP contains a 
succinct reiteration of the principles already contained in the forestry law –and 
summarized above– and an emphasis on implementing those principles and on 
creating alliances (i.e. including social actors) throughout the sector and the 
provision of support to the sector through technical assistance.  
Even though several Bolivian governments agreed and contributed to the 
present framework, the only institutions in Bolivia that have provided funds 
and put into practice projects that implemented the spirit of the legal 
framework in the forest sector have been donors, NGOs, and private 
foundations. Most notably, the American, Dutch, Swedish, and Swiss 
cooperation have invested funds and supported NGOs and foundations (such 
as Conservación International, Puma, and Fundesnap) in the forest sector. 
Experiences of community forestry, extension services, and forest 
management that followed the legal framework and anticipated the more 
recent emphasis on the implementation of policies to support the poor 
through forest management are among these. 74 experiences of communal 
                                                 
7 The law has been criticised for not allowing enough in terms of local decision 
making (Larson, 2006). Furthermore, given the lack of implementation of the law, not 
enough information is being collected on natural regeneration and no management 
practices to accelerate the reproduction of the most valuable species are implemented 
(Fredericksen et al., 2003). Under current management practice there is some evidence 
that forest regeneration cannot be achieved in the 20 years cycle (Dauber et al., 2005). 
8 The system has changed in 2003 (Decreto Supremo No 27204) following the crises 
on international prices of wood and the consequent lack of capability of logging 
companies to pay the royalties (Fredericksen et al., 2003: 40, Pacheco, 2006b: 24, 36). 
Now, the companies pay effectively 1/20 of the royalties and a small tax to finance 
the administration of the Forest Superintendence. As a result, the revenues to the state 
administration and enforcement capability of the Superintendence have both been 
diminished. 
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forest management, on a total surface of 876,966 hectares has been recorded in 
May 2005 (Benneker et al., 2005: 12). Since the government in Bolivia wants to 
make steps in similar directions, independent studies and assessments of past 
experiences might help to evaluate the potential and to orient these programs. 
The existing assessments cast some doubts about the possibility to implement 
community forestry at a rapid pace and through standardised policies.9   
With respect to implementation, over time successive governments 
contradicted the spirit and the word of the law. The spirit of the law was 
violated because granting the legal right to access forest resources to 
marginalised social actors was not sufficient for them to exploit this 
opportunity. Unless the resources necessary for undertaking sustainable 
management are also granted to the same communities, they are not going to 
have technical and financial resources to draw and implement forest 
management plans. Also the letter of the law was violated by the Bolivian 
government itself; among the violated legal provisions the “Fund for forestry 
development” (FONABOSQUE, “Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Forestal”) 
was never activated (Pacheco, 2006b: 41). Moreover, only the first head of the 
Forestry Superintendence has been nominated according to the procedures 
established in the law –that are meant to guarantee that the figure is 
independent from the government – and the rest have been ad interim (i.e. 
simply appointed by the government). Paradoxically for a sector marred in 
illegal practices, the private actors in the forestry sector have themselves 
intimated to the government to respect the law.10 Additionally, the fines that 
the forest superintendence gives go unpaid, royalties are not exacted, and the 
whole sector is marred by illegality. Finally, the legal framework is evaded on 
the ground because state institutions do not have the necessary resources to 
control operations in the forest. Information on deforestation is available 
almost in real time – thanks to a geographical information system financed by 
the German cooperation (Wachholtz et al., 2006) – but the Forest 
Superintendence is so badly equipped that it cannot intervene even against 
macroscopic violations of the law.  
The problems of enforcement and lack of operational capability of the 
forest superintendence (that we mentioned above) are –on the one hand– a 
flagrant contradiction with the assumptions implicit in the centralized system 
of enforcement and –on the other hand– the structure of enforcement is at 
odds with the principles of decentralization and participation that inspired the 
reform. Furthermore, the same contradictions mark other aspects of the 
regulatory framework such as the use of the system of forest management 
                                                 
9 For examples and evaluations of cooperation projects see Robertson and Wunder, 
2005; Endara Agramont and Villca Huanaco, 2006; PROBONA, 2006; Proyecto 
BOLFOR II, 2006; Stegeman, 2003; Benneker et al., 2005; Stegeman, 2005; COSUDE, 
2007. 
10 See the requests to the Bolivian Government that were put forward in the 
resolution of the 1er. Congreso Forestal Nacional: “El Sector Forestal dio 60 días al 
gobierno para cumplir la ley”, 
http://www.cfb.org.bo/CFBInicio/CongresoForestal/boletin.notaNF02.htm 
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plans that follow nationally standardised management frameworks and do not 
allow local knowledge to play any role. We do find intrinsic contradictions in 
the model that has a social orientation, but still has important instruments and 
whole of the enforcement mechanisms anchored to older paradigms of 
forestry. 
The government of Evo Morales –who took power in January 2006 – is 
reiterating the objectives of the legal framework and the reforms that it is 
promoting are inspired by principles that are similar to the ones of previous 
reforms, but the government is arguably taking them more seriously and paying 
special attention to indigenous issues that are linked to social exclusion and 
emphasizing community forestry as a tool for achieving the goals of poverty 
eradication and rural development.  In particular now greater emphasis is given 
to the role of indigenous communities and social groups, but at the same time 
the government is promoting the creation of a state enterprise; this initiative 
might add to existing contradictions of the whole approach and does not take 
into consideration the lack of entrepreneurial capabilities in the state and the 
history of failures of such enterprises in Latin America throughout the 1970s.  
The National Development Plan (PND, “Plan Nacional de Desarrollo”) 
includes a chapter on natural resources, where forestry is focal (Gobierno de 
Bolivia, 2006), but the private sector and forest on private land hardly gets any 
mention.11 Also, in the Development Plan for the Agriculture and Forestry 
sector (Plan de Desarrollo Sectorial – Revolucion Agraria y Forestal, Gobierno 
de Bolivia, 2007) the private sector is mentioned only a few times and the plan 
indicates that in the future forestry will be based on communities, small 
producers and state enterprises and institutions. Finally, the latest declarations 
of government ministers confirm that there is the intention to establish a state 
enterprise in the forestry sector, and to tax the export of timber. Both 
interventions run the risk of damaging existing companies operating legally in 
the sector and the association that represents the interests of the private sector 
reacted negatively.12  
The past governments and part of the cooperation have focused on the 
private sector, that – as seen above – achieved some successes in terms of its 
economic development and some aspects of its operation improved (e.g. 
certified areas). New policy interventions seem to create an uncertain 
framework damaging existing economic operations without really establishing a 
viable alternative. Considering that the potential of the forestry sector is already 
underexploited, that there is a high deforestation rate, and the lack of realistic 
evaluations of the timing and modalities for developing community forestry, 
                                                 
11 For example, in the same National Development Plan the chapter on tourism 
promotes community ecotourism, but also stipulates the need of alliances between the 
social sector to be developed mow and the existing private sector. This is in contrast 
with the forestry chapter where such alliances are not envisaged. 
12 “Preocupación en sector forestal por anuncio de empresas mixtas”, El Diario, 
11/9/2007. 
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the existing private sector should be considered a partner in the development 
of a complementary social sector.  
4   NICARAGUA 
The state of the forest and the potential of forestry 
Nicaragua has more than 5 million hectares – 42.7% of its territory – covered 
by forest and the yearly deforestation rate for the period 2000- 2005 was 1.3% 
(FAO, 2007). Data on land vocation at the national level are not available; 
signalling that land use planning is not developed yet. The total market value of 
wood products, timber and non-timber is estimated to be 43 millions dollars in 
2005 (FAO, 2007). These estimates are biased downwards because of self 
consumption and unreported illegal logging; the latter estimated at an 
astounding 70-80% of total volumes extracted, with illegally extracted logs 
marketed at much lower prices (Richards et al., 2003a: 4). To date Nicaragua 
has only 11,500 hectares of certified forest and a total of 11 certified 
companies (Forest Stewardship Council, 2007a), a symptom of the 
underdevelopment of the sector. Summing up, also in Nicaragua we have 
evidence of serious environmental degradation and of a contribution of 
forestry to the national development that is lower than its potential. 
The policy framework 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) included objectives in terms of 
approval of a new forestry law by 2002 (which was approved, albeit at the end 
of 2003), deforestation is singled out as a source of ecological vulnerability, and 
forestry was already identified as one –out of four– of the strategic clusters to 
develop. Also, the National Development Plan (“Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo”, Gobierno de Nicaragua, 2005) –that in Nicaragua can be 
considered a part of the PRSP process– includes a forestry cluster and aims at 
strengthening the whole forestry production chain, but there was very little 
implementation. 
The main policy instruments setting the framework for the working of the 
rural sector are the forestry law and the logging ban.13 The forestry law 
established the conditions for forest management: the system of forest 
management plans is similar to the one of Bolivia and the organization in 
charge of regulation and control is the National Forest Institute (“Instituto 
Nacional Forestal”, INAFOR) (Gobierno de Nicaragua, 2003). Also in this 
case there is a model that contains remnants of the older scientific forestry 
approach and some social provisions. The law includes some incentives 
towards the development of the sector mostly in the form of tax deductions; a 
                                                 
13 For a introduction to the legal framework of the forestry sector see Larson, 2006: 
35-37. 
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system that does little to promote forest management by the poor since they 
are not liable of paying little taxes in the first place. Moreover, there are 
deductions that would apply to small landholder who plant trees on their plots, 
but it is virtually impossible to take advantage of law’s provisions unless there 
is support by some external organization (NGOs or donors) due to 
bureaucratic hurdles and obstruction by the institutions that should facilitate 
the process.  
One of the few provisions, apart from the tax deductions mentioned 
above, that were meant to promote the management of forest on smaller scale 
and seemingly favour small landowners was the exemption from the need to 
have a management plan for areas of less than 50 hectares. The instrument to 
be used in such cases is the simplified plan, but it has been abused by large 
enterprises that presented several simplified plans for adjacent forest areas. 
INAFOR –who was financed by the royalties generated by authorized 
extraction activities– approved these plans turning a blind eye on their 
illegitimate nature (Global Witness, 2007:15).14 The situation changed after the 
“scandal of the River Kung Kung” that dominated the news in March and May 
2006: a great number of trees where claimed to be illegally logged and 
transported on the river.15 As a response an emergency decree was enacted to 
stop extraction and was followed by a logging ban (“Ley de veda”, Gobierno 
de Nicaragua, 2006).16 The ban prohibits extraction of 6 species of wood, bars 
any logging operation in protected areas and within 15 kms from the national 
borders, it involves the army in enforcement and suspends the simplified 
management plans. The first employment of the army was to stop the traffic of 
illegal logs in the Kung Kung river, but a substantial part of the logs 
sequestered and under the surveillance of the army disappeared.17 Some 
analyses suggest that the logging ban has not been able to stop illegal logging 
and that deforestation rates might have increased after its approval (Guzmán, 
2007). On the one hand, these happenings show how the centralized 
enforcement system oriented to extraction of resources failed to implement the 
pro-poor mechanisms in the law. On the other hand, it shows that the reaction 
of the state, again focusing on centralised enforcement mechanisms, is failing 
to produce the intended results and illustrate how the regulatory framework 
contains traits of both newer and older approaches to forestry coupled by 
implementation problems. In addition, the logging ban is a formidable obstacle 
to any future development of the sector as it forbids the legal extraction of the 
most valuable species.  
Also in Nicaragua the forestry sector has been assisted by donors investing 
in the rural sector and by NGOs. PRORURAL is supporting institutional 
                                                 
14 See also “¿Quién está detrás de mafia maderera?”, Confidencial, del 07 al 13 de 
mayo 2006. 
15 Subsequently, the court cases initiated by the loggers have shown that most of the 
logs were being extracted legally with simplified plans authorised by INAFOR. 
16 Another effect has been the criminalization of forestry activities (Larson et al., 2006: 
67). 
17 “Alerta por tucas extraviadas”, El Nuevo Diario, 26/11/2006. 
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strengthening of INAFOR, the Interamerican Development Bank is financing 
a rural extension program with a large forestry component (“Programa Socio 
Ambiental y de Desarrollo Forestal”, POSAF), implemented by the Ministry of 
Natural Resources18 and GTZ has a Natural resources program (“Programa de 
Recursos Naturales”, PRORENA). The WWF is promoting a project on 
community forestry that is particularly successful and is the only case of 
community management that has achieved certification in the country (Salazar 
and Gretzinger, 2004b, MAGFOR et al., 2005: 122).  
5   HONDURAS 
The state of the forest and the potential of forestry 
Honduras has 4.5 millions hectares – 41.5% of the territory – covered by forest 
and the yearly deforestation rate for the period 2000- 2005 was 3.1%; one of 
the highest in the world (FAO, 2007).19 The forestry laws define what portions 
of the territory is apt only for forest (according to parameters such as the 
steepness of the slope, or services such as watershed protection), and many 
areas that currently have a different land use are supposed to revert to forest. 
In fact, estimates from the Honduran Forest Development Corporation  
(COHDEFOR, “Corporación Hondureña de Desarrollo Forestal”) indicate 
that 87% of the country has forestry vocation (Vallejos Larios and Guillén 
Coronado, 2006:13), but land use planning at the national level – identifying 
the best use of each plot – has not been implemented. The value of forest 
products – timber and non timber – is estimated at 63 millions dollars in 2005 
(FAO, 2007) and there are 60,000 people employed directly in forestry 
(Richards et al., 2003a: 15). To these figures self consumption and illegal 
extraction must be added. An assessment of the dependency of indigenous 
communities on the forest found that between 15 and 40% of the total value 
of consumption – for two Tawahka communities – derives directly from the 
forest (Godoy et al., 2002:404). Furthermore, estimates of illegal logging range 
between a 80% of total volume extracted for broadleaf and 50% for coniferous 
species (Richards et al., 2003a: 1). Certification is not developed and the 
country has a limited amount of certified forest: 47,400 hectares (Forest 
Stewardship Council, 2007a) and only 6 certified companies. Overall, also in 
the case of Honduras we have evidence of forest management’s contribution 
to development, but also that much of its potential is unexploited. 
                                                 
18 See http://www.posaf.org.ni/. 
19 75% of forest is public (FAO, 2007), but tenure is so problematic that in most cases 
some individuals are in possession of state forests and a range of different estimates 
on land ownership are available from different sources. 
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The policy framework 
The policy framework regulating access to forest resources was 
characterised by great confusion, before the law approved in 2007 is 
implemented, with at least 38 laws governing the sector (FAO, 2006). In this 
current framework, COHDEFOR has a department promoting the “social 
forestry sector” through local cooperatives (Richards et al., 2003a:24), but its 
impact is questionable. In the words of the president of the largest association 
of cooperatives, “many of the cooperatives are composed solely by one person 
with some documents in a briefcase”.20 Furthermore, some cooperatives have 
been infiltrated by criminality, and local leaders have been corrupted by illegal 
loggers (Global Witness and CONADEH, 2006:10; EIA, 2005:4). 
Corruption is a barrier to legal logging – it facilitates illegal operations and 
creates obstacles to legal ones – and evidence of it abounds in Honduras. 
Bribes are extorted also from certified community forestry operations and 
reportedly without bribes transport of legal wood becomes impossible (Rodas 
et al., 2005: 53). In the words of a forest official of COHDEFOR from the San 
Pedro Sula region “for the police the worst loggers are legal loggers: they do 
not want to pay bribes!”. COHDEFOR itself is a synonym of corruption – as 
recognised in public meetings even by its current director – and its abolition by 
the new law received unanimous approval.21 When during a field visit we met a 
convoy transporting illegally-extracted mahogany logs from the Tawahka 
biosphere one of the drivers expressed his confidence that he would not face 
troubles: in case the convoy would be stopped by any enforcement agent the 
owner of the wood would be able to “sort things out”. Shortly after our visit a 
member of a local NGO was killed, but no actions are undertaken even though 
the offender is a know drug dealer also involved in illegal logging. Also in the 
case of Honduras, we have traits of new management approaches mixed with 
older models –especially in terms of enforcement– and the associated 
implementation problems. 
The failures of the system have prompted the birth of a strong 
environmental movement that is vocal, but faces numerous challenges. On the 
one hand, members of the movement receive threats from illegal loggers and 
some of its members suffered deadly attacks (EIA, 2005: III, 3-4). On the 
other hand, the judiciary treats environmentalists’ breaking the law – e.g. 
because of organizing road blocks – as members of criminal organization 
(using the tough legislation against organised crime) and make their opposition 
to criminal activities difficult.22  
                                                 
20 Andrés Solórzano (Federación Hondureña de Cooperativas Agroforestales, 
FECAHFOR), 2007, personal communication. 
21 According to the current director of Cohdefor, the institution cannot ask to manage 
additional the funds disbursed for reforestation because it is widely renown for 
corruption. On corruption episodes involving Cohdefor see also EIA, 2005: 11-14, 
17-18. 
22 Victor Ochoa (Movimiento Ambientalista Olanchano, MAO), 2007, personal 
communication. 
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Some experiments of communal management exist: several donors 
assisted the cooperative COATLAH (Rodas et al., 2005:50), and GTZ (the 
German technical cooperation) is supporting two projects of community 
forestry in Olancho (PRORENA, 2007). Other projects are promoting the 
extraction of logs and resins by cooperatives (Nygren, 2005), but in general the 
number of positive experiences is limited. Other projects are focusing on 
extension activities of farmers that are within protected areas, such as the ones 
of ICADE, and deal with forestry only indirectly. Again, alternatives work with 
financial, organizational and technical support and changes in the policy 
framework should help to decrease the level of support needed for undertaking 
sustainable forest management.  
Also in the case of Honduras the PRSP included forest management. In 
the PRSP there is the objective of approving the new forestry law by 2002 (as 
mentioned above the new law was eventually approved in 2007) and 
developing a forestry cluster (Gobierno de Honduras, 2001). The strategy 
outlines the link between slash and burn practices, deforestation and land 
degradation and acknowledges the country’s potential to develop a sustainable 
forest sector contributing to ‘economic growth, employment generation and 
reduction of poverty, especially in rural areas’. The policy measures foreseen to 
contribute to the sector include support to small enterprises, provision of 
technological transfers and of community land management (in relation to 
solving land tenure problems).  Also pricing strategies and payments for 
environmental services are mentioned as means to preserve forest cover and –
given the high incidence of deforestation– also reforestation and plantations 
are mentioned as activities.  
The approval of the new forestry law (in September 2007) created many 
expectations and support by environmental groups and other social actors, but 
its implementation started with a long delay in its publication and official 
enactment.23 The law includes the abolition of COHDEFOR and the 
establishment of the Institute of Forest Development and Conservation 
(“Instituto de Conservación y Desarrollo Forestal”), more resources for 
enforcement and harsher penalties against those who commit forest-related 
crimes. It must be noted that 3 members of current cabinet (including the 
serving president) and the director of CODEHFOR are – or were – owners or 
employees of logging companies, a fact that casts doubts about the real 
intentions of the government. Apart from the new law, the forestry sector has 
been visible in the news and the government has been active on forestry issues. 
On the first day of his mandate, the president Zelaya indicated that 1% of the 
state budget would be used for reforestation and protection, and the army 
would be involved in enforcement. The declaration about the budget 
commitment has been repeated many times, but only one sixth of the amount 
has been disbursed.24 Of the resources that effectively were employed for the 
                                                 
23 “Aprobada la ley forestal”, El Heraldo, 14/09/2007, the law was eventually 
Publisher only at the end of February 2008. 
24 Ernesto Ponce (Secretaria de Recursos Naturales y Ambiente, SERNA), 2007, 
personal communication. 
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sector, the military absorbed 70% without producing any evidence that 
enforcement has improved; on the contrary some circumstantiated evidence – 
referring to specific episodes – suggests that the militaries tend to use their 
powers and resources to benefit from illegal logging rather than the combating 
it.25 This is another striking example of how new policy interventions on 
enforcement systems are still modelled over older approaches; it also confirms 
how these enforcement structures are ineffective in improving compliance with 
the regulatory framework and how centralized enforcement agencies tend to 
become a part of the problem rather than a solution. In sum, also in Honduras 
we find lack of implementation of the regulatory framework together with 
policies that belong to older approaches of forest management.  
2   COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Forest management and its failures 
The unsatisfactory environmental outcomes of the current management 
regimes highlighted above are synthesised by the fact that all of the three 
countries have high rates of deforestation. Also from the socio-economic 
perspective none of the countries is able to fulfil its aspirations in terms of 
forest management: as seen above the experiences of with social forestry are 
limited and dependent on donors and the sector is underdeveloped. These 
results stand in contrast with the fact that the potential of forestry for poverty 
reduction has been recognised since a long time. The renewed interest in 
forestry might indicate a real concern, but reforms and policies have been 
announced (and in many cases are already in place) without proper 
implementation and are marked by intrinsic flaws. As a result the sector is 
characterised by an only apparent paradox: there is under-exploitation of most 
forest areas coupled with deforestation and permanent land use change. The 
PRSP process in the three countries followed existing trends in forestry policy 
and, while it might have helped to accelerate and achieve change, is not 
possible to recognise any major breakthrough due to it. 
We can find the roots of these disappointing outcomes at the individual 
and at the collective level and we can think about ultimate and proximate 
causes of this situation (Bromley, 1999). Ultimate causes refer to the volition of 
individuals and organizations; proximate cases to the conditions that affect 
them. At the individual level, sustainable forest management and forest 
conservation are not the most profitable options and often they are not 
feasible; illegal logging and deforestation –at the level of economic agents– are 
caused by the desire to extract valuable logs and to convert land for agriculture. 
In other words, illegal extraction and trade of timber is more profitable 
that legal alternatives and land uses other than forest are more profitable, at 
                                                 
25 This was confirmed by numerous sources including researchers, environmentalists 
and developmental NGOs. 
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least in the short time horizon. A number of conditions determine this 
situation and they can be considered the proximate causes of deforestation; 
hereafter we mention some of the most obvious ones, but we are not 
proposing a comprehensive list. In general, the costs of operating legally are 
substantially higher then illegally and – given the widespread illegality – the 
legal sector faces unfair competition (Richards et al., 2003b). Furthermore, the 
sector is penalised with respect to activities based on alternative land uses (such 
as agriculture) (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2004: 1); a common request by those 
involved in forestry is that incentives should be set up to promote the sector, 
rather than try to regulate it further.26 The conditions that contribute to this 
situation include the uncertain investment climate, the lack of financial 
services, and excessive bureaucratization. 
Another reason of attrition between policy objectives and reality is at the 
collective action level; this level is the relevant one for the analysis of the 
reforms failures on which we are focusing on here. Public policy can be 
understood as collective action – we follow the institutional economics 
tradition – aiming at restraining, liberating and enabling individuals and 
organizations (Ostrom, 1990: 51; Bromley, 2004: 79). The public policy 
framework – as seen above – lacks the implementation elements that might 
enable economic agents (individually, or as an organization) to take advantage 
of economic opportunities associated with forest management. At the 
collective level, the ultimate cause of the dismal state of forest management is 
that collective agents did not put those policies in place.  
These policy failures can be –at least partially– traced back to corruption 
at the political and bureaucratic level and to political will. Corruption – the 
abuse of power for private interest – is widespread in environmental policies 
and forest management is not an exception (Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006). 
Elites that have been appropriating natural resources are unlikely to change 
their course unless faced by coalitions of citizens that challenge them 
(Johnston, 2005). These elites have been able to reap huge profits through 
illegal logging and concentrating land ownership of land that changed use away 
from forest and they are able to exert their power on political actors; at times 
becoming directly involved in politics as in Honduras.  
Also at the implementation level, state agencies in charge of enforcement 
are perceived to be corrupt in Nicaragua and Honduras and – as mentioned 
above – the phenomenon has been documented extensively. In Bolivia the 
problem is not perceived to be so large possibly because control exercised by 
the state is so tenuous that it is not necessary to resort to corruption to 
undertake illegal activities. While it is very difficult to control the forest with 
the type of centralised systems that prevail in the three countries, viable 
alternatives are not being implemented. The search for other enforcement 
models would indicate that decentralization with participation of local 
communities seems to be the only way forward where state agencies are weak 
                                                 
26 Currently a ban on log exports is under discussion in Bolivia, although it was already 
experimented in the past with little results (Fredericksen et al., 2003:38). 
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(see Pellegrini, 2007) and that a radical rethinking of forestry --and of the 
colonial models that still inspires it-- is necessary to let local communities 
benefit from forest management (Larson and Ribot, 2007). Also recent policy 
interventions in the sector are based on unrealistic assumption of state and 
state agent’s capabilities; in Bolivia this is exemplified by the establishment of a 
state enterprise and in Nicaragua and Honduras it is reflected by the 
continuous focus on centralized enforcement structures.  
Once we consider the problems in the sector and the challenges successful 
reforms will face, we might want to think about a reform process that is 
participatory already in its formulation and would include consultations of the 
actors that are involved in the sector and could contribute to a new system to 
guarantee coherence and avoid interventions informed by older approaches. 
The actors that are to become central in the new model should be elicited to 
express their concerns in an inclusive exercise. When we interviewed small 
holders and community organizations they have mentioned the problems that 
we highlighted above, but also a number of other issues. Their indications 
could serve as the basis for new reform programs and implementation of 
existing formal regimes. In this paper we followed a similar approach: we 
consulted the stakeholders and the potential beneficiaries of a reformed 
forestry sector on what the problems were blocking the development of the 
sector and their answer informed our analysis. For example, we cited the case 
of enforcement failures and –barring illegal loggers– these were mentioned to 
us as real barriers to sustainable forest management by all the actors (including 
enforcement agents that would blame each other). What we suggest here is 
similar to the dialogues that were part of the PRSP process and our belief is 
that their failure is due to the lack of political will necessary to organize them 
effectively and to implement the policies coming out of them, rather than 
intrinsic faults of the instrument. As any other participatory initiatives, 
dialogues are bound to fail if the policy makers do not support them.  
If it is not easy to promote sweeping reforms and many of the failures 
might fall in the implementation stage, one way to tackle the shortcomings of 
the sector is to identify and act upon the most stringent problems of each 
country in a diagnostic tree process (a la Rodrik, 2006). Ultimately the 
development of sustainable forestry depends on the fact that individuals find it 
more convenient to illegally extract logs and change land use of forests, the 
most important barriers to sustainable forestry in each country should be 
identified and acted upon. 
The success of the new movement towards the development of social 
forestry will depend on solving the problems that affect the sector as a whole 
together with the problems of involving and organizing impoverished 
communities.27 The challenge of establishing decentralised community-based 
                                                 
27 This problems include the lack of entrepreneurial capabilities to satisfy reliably the 
market and one of the lessons coming from an analysis of community forestry in 
Bolivia is that it is important to start operations form the simplest possible activities 
(e.g. Stegeman, 2003: 31, 41). 
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systems that benefit the poor should not be underestimated (Nygren, 2005) 
and not all communities are ready or willing to undertake community forestry 
management: many projects face problems with corruption, mismanagement, 
and require a lengthy process to develop from simple harvesting logs to parts 
of the production chain with more value added. Typically, they require large 
resources and time and might work better if coordinated with the private 
sector rather than trying to replace it altogether. The first steps of community 
forestry could be integrated in existing private initiatives; for the poor to 
benefit from forestry affirmative actions and positive discrimination should be 
part of the policies (Larson and Ribot, 2007), without presupposing that the 
poor will be able to develop a new sector at once. 
7   CONCLUSIONS 
The forestry sector has the potential to contribute to rural development in 
Bolivia, Nicaragua and Honduras, but this potential is vastly underexploited. 
While deforestation rates are high in the three countries, the area of forests 
under management is far below what is feasible and the general policy 
framework is not conducive to the development of the sector. 
We have argued that the regulatory framework of the forest sector in the 
three countries is marked by reform failures because important features of the 
policy framework are not implemented. At the same time, the sector is 
characterised by failures to reform: remnants of older approaches remain in 
crucial parts of the new systems, especially with respect to centralized 
enforcement; parts of the regulation and enforcement systems are in fragrant 
contradiction with the decentralized and participatory approach that should be 
underpinning the new policies. In this sense, the policy framework of forest 
management in the three countries is marked by a failure to reform matched by 
reform failures. 
This is not to say that a full fledged reform re-orienting the system 
towards decentralization and participation would certainly work in every 
instance (Veron et al., 2006); the point is that the truncated moves towards 
decentralization and the current failures of the system cannot be attributed to 
the reform efforts, but rather to the lack of changes and of their lax 
implementation. The PRSPs seem to have played a limited role in the three 
countries: they confirmed the objectives of existing policies but did not 
contribute to any noticeable improvement of implementation nor highlighted 
the changes needed to have a policy structure coherent with the principles of 
participation and decentralization. 
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